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STUDENT NOTES
cedures contemplating only sua sponte inception of an in banc
sitting. The former left it to each court to elect whether the
judges should all vote on in banc petitions or whether this should
be delegated to the division; the latter felt that only the first
course would serve the purposes of section 46 (c).
There is the utmost variety in the extent to which the circuits,
since the Western Pacific decision, exhibit conformity with the
views there expressed. The range extends from the third circuit's
elaborate procedure to the seventh circuit's utter absence of pro-
cedure for a complete nonuse of the in banc power. The second,
sixth, and seventh circuits, since they have no established pro-
cedures, of course, have none than can be "clearly explained" to
litigants. While these circuits do not prohibit such hearings, it
may be that they are curtailing the in banc power "indiscrimi-
nately." The eighth and ninth circuits, in providing for having
petitions of litigants for rehearing in banc ruled on by the division,
have chosen an option permissible under the majority but con-
demned by the concurring opinion. The third, tenth, and District
of Columbia circuits' established procedures seem fully to conform
to the Western Pacific opinion and afford to other circuits useful
though not identical patterns of how conformity may be achieved.
The feasibility of formulating criteria for application to all
cases coming before the court to determine whether there should
be an in banc sitting is doubtful."" The classes of cases in which
the District of Columbia circuit has used its in banc power is,
however, suggestive of those appropriate for consideration by full
court.
C.R.M.
LAW OF SAFETY DEPOSIT BoxEs.-The growth of safety deposit
business to its present commercial importance had its origin as an
incident of banking from its very beginning when the goldsmiths
of London received money, bullion and plate from depositors
merely for safe-keeping.' Though a body of law, separate from the
general law of banking, has developed concerning safe-deposit
boxes, the business of leasing depositories for the safe-keeping of
valuables is nearly always conducted by a bank or trust company
69 See Laskin, The Supreme Court of Canada, 29 CAN. B. REV. 1038, 1043
(1951). The Supreme Court of Canada though it sits in division and in banc
has no established criteria to be applied to all cases to determine if a particular
one is proper for a full court hearing.
S1I ZoLLmAN, BANKS & BANKING 34 (Perm. ed. 1936).
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either directly or through affiliated or subsidiary corporations.
This affiliation is a natural one and probably derives from the
older accommodation of keeping customer's valuables in the bank
vaults-a rather unsatisfactory arrangement to both bank and
customer.2
Although the law concerning safe-deposit boxes has been de-
veloped by case law for the most part, as will appear in later dis-
cussion, several states have undertaken to establish the rights and
liabilities of the parties by statute.
The mechanics of customer access to a safety-deposit box,
once rented, is very nearly the same throughout the country. The
deposit company has a master key, which, when used together
with the depositor's key, will open the box. The bank has no
independent access to the safety box, and the door to the box must
be forced and a new lock drilled if the depositor's key is lost. The
fact that neither party has an independent right or means to
possession is most troubling to courts when defining the relationship
existing between the deposit company and the customer.
Relationship of the Parties. When a bank, holding itself out
as having special facilities for the safe-keeping of valuables, accepts
property for safe-keeping, the great weight of authority maintains
that a bailor-bailee relationship is created. 3 This position, how-
ever, has not escaped criticism. Some courts have held the rela-
tionship, to be one of landlord and tenant, 4 and others have
suggested that the true relationship created is that of a licensee-
licensor.n Another and less categorical view maintains that it is
neither a bailment, a tenancy, a license, but a hybrid, and that
possibly the true classification will depend upon the specific
problem with which the court is confronted.6
By the majority rule, previously referred to, it is immaterial
that the bank does not know the nature and value of the contents
of the box. 7  Critics of this view argue that a bailee must have
exclusive possession of the property, and since, in these transactions,
the usual practice is for the opening of the box to require two
keys, one in the bank's, the other in the lessee's possession, the
2 For the various problems raised in such a situation, see generally Phares
v. Hood, 118 W. Va. 208, 189 S.E. 707 (1937).
3 Cussen v. Southern California Savings Bank, 133 Cal. 534, 5 Pac. 1099
(1901). For a collection of cases, see 6 Am. Jun. 490.
4 E.g., Carples v. Cumberland Coal & Iron Co., 240 N.Y. 187, 148 N.E. 185
(1925).
5 E.g., National Safety Deposit Co. v. Stead, 232 U.S. 58 (1914).6 Note, 17 IowA L. REv. 505 (1925).
7See note 3 supra.
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bank does not have sufficient possession to satisfy this requisite of
a bailment.8 Another ground of criticism is that the bank does not
have the necessary intent to control the contents of the box, since
the duty of the bank is not that of controlling the box, but rather
the negative duty of excluding unauthorized persons from access
thereto. 9
The tenancy theory has enjoyed only a meager following,
primarily because the lessee or tenant is not given free, unen-
cumbered access to the property rented as is an ordinary incident
of a tenancy.10 The license theory has found little, if any, judicial
support although it has been forcefully advocated on the analogy
of a person renting a room in a house, the possession or control
of which remains in the owner of the house while the renter has
access to and the use of the room. It was urged that the contents
of a safe-deposit box do not come into possession of the bank any
more than the personal belongings of the renter of a room come
into the possession of the owner of the house."
Despite plausible arguments for and against each proposed
relationship, most courts in the language of typical opinions
".... think it unnecessary to define the precise relationship between
the parties,"'1 and regard arguments for the tenancy theory as
"interesting but not persuasive." 13  The West Virginia court,
without mentioning the other possibilities, accepted the view that
a bank is a bailee.'
4
Among jurisdictions which adhere to the bailment theory,
there is a conflict of opinion as to what type of bailment is
created. One view is that when a bank receives direct compensa-
tion for the safe-keeping of valuables, it is a bailment for hire,
but when there is no direct compensation, a gratuitous bailment
is created. 15 The West Virginia court, however, has held in a
case where there was no direct compensation, that "Banking in-
stitutions receiving articles of unusual value, and holding them-
selves out as having special facilities for their safe-keeping, are not
accommodation bailees; the compensation being indirect benefits."'1
8 Note, I11 MINN. L. REv. 440 (1926)
9 Sawyer v. Lowell National Bank, 20 Mass. 342, 119 N.E. 825 (1918).
10 Morgan v. Citizens Bank, 190 N.C. 209, 129 S.E. 585 (1925).
11 See note 8 supra.
12 McDonald v. William Perkins & Co., 133 Wash. 622, 632, 234 Pac. 456, 459
(192'3 Morgan v. Citizens Bank, 190 N.C. 209, 213, 129 S.E. 585, 587 (1925).
14 Hill v. Mnsted National Bank, 95 W. Va. 649, 123 S.E. 417 (1924).
'5 Merchants National Bank v. Guilmartin, 88 Ga. 797, 15 S.E. 831 (1892).
16 Hill v. Ansted National Bank, 95 W. Va. 649, 657, 123 S.E. 417, 418 (1924)
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Liabilities of the parties. Since the relationship between the
bank and a renter of a safe-deposit box is that of a bailment for
hire, ". . . the rules and principles of the rights and duties of a
bailee for hire are generally applicable thereto."'1  In the general
law of bailments, in the absence of express provisions to the con-
trary, a bailee for hire is required to use that degree of care which
would be exercised by a person of ordinary prudence and care
in the protection of his own property.'8 The orthodox rule, ac-
cepted in West Virginia, 9 fixes the same duty of care on the bank
as on any bailee for hire;20 but there is some authority that a bank,
in such circumstances, is under a duty to exercise the highest degree
of care and is liable for loss resulting from slight negligence.2 1
Even though a bailment depends upon a contract, the bailor-
renter, in suing the bailee-bank, is not limited to an action
sounding in contract but may sue the bailee in tort for his negligence
in the safe-keeping of the contents of the box. 22 In such an action,
the contributory negligence of the bailor-renter may afford a de-
fense to the bank.
23
The relationship between the bank and the lessee of a safe-
deposit box depends upon a contract express or implied. Today
the contracts are almost universally express, taking the form of
standard printed contracts. They contain various provisions which
attempt to adjust the relationship between, and the rights, duties,
and liabilities of, the parties. There is much uncertainty and con-
flict as to the validity of these provisions. Generally, their legality
will depend upon the type and degree of departure from the usual
incidents of bailment which they attempt.
As 3vith any other bailment, the parties may by special pro-
vision define their rights and liabilities, where the provisions are
explicit and unambiguous, and do not contravene public policy.2 4
Thus a bank may, by special contract, and in the absence of a
prohibitive statute, assume the liability of an insurer.25 There is
more doubt concerning a contract which attempts to restrict the
liability of the bank. Such provisions vary widely, the most com-
l"Wilson v. Citizens Central Bank, 56 Ohio App. 478, 480, 11 N.E.2d 118,
119 (1936).
18 BROWN, LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 284 (1936).
1o See note 14 supra.
20 See note 3 supra.
2l Underhill v. United States Trust Co., 195 Ky. 149, 241 S.W. 812 (1922).
22 See note 17 supra.
23 Saddler v. National Bank, 335 Il1. App. 18, 80 N.E.2d 387 (1948).24 Schaefer v. Washington Safety Deposit Co., 281 Ill. 43, 117 N.E. 781
(1917).
25 Roberts v. Minier, 240 IMI. App. 518 (1926).
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mon one and definitely the most troublesome one taking the form
of an attempt to exempt the bank from liability for its negligence.
At one time many courts permitted the bank to contract itself
out of liability for negligence, regardless of degree,2 and most
courts would permit contractual exemptions from liability for all
but gross negligence.2 7 However, the modern tendency is to in-
validate such sweeping exculpatory clauses, when used by those
whose contracts for bailment are entered into in the course of the
bailee's general dealings with the public. 28  A bank or safe-deposit
company might be deemed such a bailee, and, a number of more
recent decisions reach this conclusion. The part of a provision
that "The lessor shall use due diligence that no unauthorized
person shall be admitted to any rented safe, and beyond this the
lessor shall not be responsible for the contents of any .safe rented
from it", has been said to be intended to fix only ". . . the degree
of care required to be exercised by the defendant, not in guarding
the property placed in its charge, but in the identification of parties
claiming to be customers. It follows that the defendant was called
upon by law to use that degree of care . . . which is demanded
from a bailee for hire . . ."21 Another variation of the same type
of provision is seen in a West Virginia case, where an acknowledg-
ment of the receipt of valuables provided, ". .. same to have the
same protection as we give our own bonds, securities, cash, etc.
But further than this we do not assume responsibility, that is to
say, should burglars blow open the safe and steal the bonds, we will
not be responsible." The court, without discussing the validity
or effect of the writing, said that the bailee's exercise of the same
degree of care as it exercised over its own property of similar
character was merely prima fade evidence of diligence rebuttable
by proof that the bank was negligent in the care of its own property
and concluded that the jury was warranted in finding that the
bank had not exercised reasonable care.3 This was a receipt
and not a term in a written bailment contract, but it is submitted
that, had it been the latter, the result would have been no different.
A provision substantially similar, incorporated in a written bail-
ment contract, has been dismissed if intended as limiting the bank's
26 Willis, Right of Bailees to Contract against Liability for Negligence,. 20
HARv. L. =. 297 (1906).
27 Ibid.
2s Note, 175 A.L.R. 111 (1948).
29 McDonald v. Perkins & Co., 133 Wash. 622, 637, 284 Pac. 456, 461 (1925).
30 See note 14 supra.
31 Ibid.
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liability for negligence, since the law fixes such liability.3 2 How-
ever, other jurisdictions do give effect to such provisions,"3 although
subject even there to being strictly construed against the bank.34
Two restrictive provisions used by some banks in West Vir-
ginia invite attention. One is that the bank under no circum-
stances should be considered as a bailee, nor otherwise in control
or possession of the contents of a leased box, the relation being
solely one of landlord and tenant. This is of doubtful practical
significance because ". . . regardless of how the relationship is
regarded, . . . whether it is that of bailor and bailee or of landlord
and tenant, the rule governing the liabilities of the parties is the
same." 15  The other is that an unauthorized opening shall not be
presumed or inferred from proof of partial or total loss of contents.
Again this would seem of negligible importance since a prima facie
case of liability is established by a showing of delivery of the
property to the bank, under the contract, and failure of the bank
to return upon demand.3 6
It is submitted that such exculpatory provisions should not be
valid, since to adopt any other course would permit the bank to
escape liability for breach of a duty which the ordinary renter,
without any knowledge of the law involved, would naturally
assume the bank to bear.
Rights of third parties. With the construction of larger and
stronger vaults and the employment of better means in general to
safeguard the holdings of banks, chances are rapidly diminishing
that a deposit company will incur liability for a theft or loss of
property caused by its negligence. The greater problem for the
deposit company arises when it is called upon to grant access to
a deposit box to a third person who is acting under legal process
or color of same.
When the contents of a deposit box are sought under color of
legal process, the character of the duty imposed upon deposit com-
panies is subject to little dispute. One court has aptly said, "When
property in the custody of a bailee for hire is demanded by third
persons, under color of process, it becomes his duty to ascertain
whether the process is such as requires him to surrender the
property, and if it is not, then it is his right and duty to refuse,
32 Sporsem v. First National Bank, 133 Wash. 199, 233 Pac. 641 (1925).
33 Sagendorph v. First National Bank of Philmont, 218 N.Y. Supp. 191, 218
App. Div. 285 (1926); Sturm v. Boker, 150 U.S. 312 (1893).
34Langford v. Nevin, 117 Tex. 130, 298 S.W. 536 (1927).
-5Wilson v. Citizens Central Bank, 56 Ohio App. 478, 480, 11 N.E.2d 118,
119 (1936).
30 See note 10 supra.
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and to offer such resistance to the taking, and adopt such measures
for reclaiming it if taken, as a prudent and intelligent man would
if it had been demanded and taken under a claim of right to the
property by another without legal process." 37  The property there
involved was taken from the deposit box by officers acting under a
search warrant whose property description materially varied from
that of the property in the safety box. The deposit company was
held liable, having registered only a formal complaint against the
officers' entrance into the vault.
The result represents an application of the orthodox general
principle that a delivery of bailed property by the bailee to one,
not the true owner and not authorized by the bailor to receive
it, is of itself a conversion. 38 Moreover, when the deposit is founded
upon express contract, as is normal today, it is common for the
deposit company expressly to contract to restrain unauthorized
entrance by third persons except under legal process, and liability
is present on purely contractual principles when loss occurs by
entrance under irregular process.
If the process is regular and of the type which lawfully can
be directed against safety deposit boxes, the deposit company is
exempt from responsibility for subsequent acts of officers seizing
the property. The problem is to determine the types of process
which may be directed against a safe-deposit box. There is com-
plete disagreement over whether a deposit box may be reached by
garnishment. On the theory that the deposit-company has no
possession of the property in the deposit-box, some courts have
refused to allow a garnishment writ to be directed against the
property therein,39 while other courts approve its use.4 0  Several
states have resolved the issue by statute.41  An attachment pro-
ceeding, it is agreed, may reach safe-deposit property.42  When
the contents of the deposit box are attached or garnished, the
deposit company is not liable for property of third persons taken
from the debtor's box because such property is confused with the
debtor's. 43 The remedy of the third person would be appropriate
action against the levying officers.
37 Roberts v. Sturvesant Safe-Deposit Co., 123 N.Y. 57, 66, 25 N.E. 294, 296
(1890).
38 Baer v. Slater, 261 Mass. 153, 158 N.E. 528 (1927).
39 Medlyn v. Ananieff, 126 Conn. 169, 10 A.2d 867 (1939).
40 Blanks v. Radford, 172 Ky. 75, 188 S.W.2d 879 (1945); Morris v. Beatty,
323 111. App. 390, 55 N.E.2d 830 (1944).
41 i VA. CoDE tit. 6, § 264.1 (Michie, 1950); Wis. STATS. § 267.025 (1951)
provide for the garnishment of safe-deposit box contents.
42 Carples v. Cumberland Coal & Iron Co., 240 N.Y. 187, 148 N.E. 185 (1925).
43 Wilson v. Lane, 35 N.H. 466 (1856).
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Joint tenants. Special problems have arisen where plural renters
contract for a single safe-deposit box. Breach by the deposit com-
pany of a provision that the bank will give access to the renters
only jointly and not individually may render the company liable
for the contents removed from the box.44
Whether the renters are joint tenants with rights of survivor-
ship in the contents has been answered in line with the current
disfavor of joint survivorship, by refusing to find a joint tenancy





Li~mLrrms UNDER PROiOTES CoNTRAcT.-It is often necessary
in the organization of a corporation for those persons promoting.the
organization to make contracts with outsiders on behalf of the
proposed corporation before its organization is completed. The
necessity for such contracts raises many problems with regard to the
liabilities of the promoters, the corporation, or both. Before an
understanding of these problems is possible, it is necessary to ascer-
tain just exactly what a promoter is. "A promoter is a person who
brings about the incorporation and organization of a corporation,
and who brings together the persons who become interested in the
enterprise, and who aids in procuring subscriptions and sets in
motion the machinery which leads to the formation of the cor-
poration."' A promoter is not the agent of the corporation and
cannot contract for it.2 This is because the organization of the
corporation has not been completed and thus there is no principal
in existence. Several West Virginia cases have spoken of the pro-
moters as agents although it seems that the court did not actually
treat them as such.
3
It has been held throughout the United States that a corpora-
tion is not liable upon contracts made on its behalf by its pro-
moters before incorporation unless after incorporation it expressly
44 First National Bank v. Fite, 131 Tex. 525, 115 S.W.2d 1105 (1958).
4In re Jirovec, 285 Ill. App. 499, 507, 2 N.E.2d 354, 357 (1936).
I Cox v. National Coal & Oil Investment Co., 61 W. Va. 291, 56 S.E. 494
(1907).2 Clifton" v. Tomb, 21 F.2d 895 (4th Cir. 1927); BALLANTINE, MANUAL OF
CORPORATION LAW & PRACTICE 155 (1930).
3 Wallace v. Eclipse Pocahontas Coal Co., 85 W. Va. 521, 98 S.E. 293 (1919);
McCullough v. Clark, 81 W. Va. 743, 95 S.E. 787 (1918).
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